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Abstract
Forecasting election outcomes is a hugely popular activity, and not without reason: outcomes
can have significant economic impacts, for example on stock prices. As such, it is economically
important, as well as of academic interest, to determine the forecasting methods that have historically
performed best. However, forecasts are often incompatible, as some are in terms of vote shares,
and others are probabilistic outcome forecasts. In this paper we set out an empirical method for
transforming opinion poll vote shares into probabilistic forecasts, and then evaluate the performance
of prediction markets and opinion polls. We compare along two dimensions: bias and precision. We
find that converted opinion polls perform well in terms of bias, and prediction markets on precision.
JEL Classification: C53, D83, D72.
Keywords: Forecasting Models, Information and Knowledge, Elections, Voting Behavior, Prediction
Markets.
1 Introduction
Electoral outcomes can have significant economic impacts; as such, it is economically important, as
well as of academic interest, to evaluate forecasting methods for elections. In this article we compare
forecasts of US election outcomes from a number of prediction markets and opinion polls.
Opinion polls are surveys of the voting intentions of a sample of voters, while prediction markets
allow participants to trade contracts whose value is contingent on some outcome occurring. The largest
commercial prediction markets over this period produced predicted probabilities, whereas opinion polls
produced projected vote shares. Thus we first develop an empirical method for converting vote shares
into outcome probabilities. We then compare the two sources of forecasts by considering both bias and
precision, which are both elegantly reflected in the commonly used Brier score, or mean squared error.
We consider all opinion polls from two common aggregators of polling information (Real Clear Politics
and Pollster), and look at three well-known prediction markets: Intrade, Betfair and Iowa Electronic
Markets (IEM, henceforth). There have already been academic investigations into the performance of
opinion polls and prediction markets (e.g. Kou and Sobel, 2004; Leigh and Wolfers, 2006; Berg et al.,
2008; Rothschild, 2009), and we contribute to this growing body of evidence.
While prediction markets have a long and rich history (Rhode and Strumpf, 2013), their internet-
based electronic variants have been gathering increasing attention in recent years, and 2012 arguably
1
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Search frequency of Gallup, Intrade and Betfair on Google
Date
Se
ar
ch
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Gallup
Intrade
Betfair
Figure 1: Relative frequency of searches for Gallup, Intrade and Betfair on Google. 100 refers to the
week with most searches of Gallup, Intrade or Betfair since 2004. Source: Google Trends.
marked the year where one of them, Intrade, was regularly in the news alongside traditional polling
information. Figure 1 provides some background on this, as it reports the relative search frequencies
on Google in the US for Gallup (a historic polling company), Intrade and Betfair (the two best known
prediction markets). Google search information is available since early 2004, and hence three election
cycles are distinctly visible, in 2004, 2008 and 2012, by the spikes in search volume for most pertinently
Gallup, but also Intrade. Gallup registers more than sixty times more searches around the 2004 election
than Intrade, but only ten times more in 2008, and three times more in 2012.
The 2012 election, and to a lesser extent the 2004 and 2008 elections, also bore witness to a dis-
tinct divergence between the two most commonly known prediction markets, Intrade and Betfair, as
Republican presidential candidates tended to be priced more favourably on Intrade than Betfair. This
divergence is noted in Rothschild and Sethi (2016), who analyse the behaviour of one particular trader
who lost around $4m apparently manipulating the market price in favour of the Republican candidate,
Mitt Romney. A clear implication of the Rothschild and Sethi (2016) paper is that there was a distinct
bias on Intrade relative to Betfair (and also the Iowa Electronic Markets); investigating bias forms part
of our description of each market.
We thus enable enhanced comparison between opinion polls and prediction markets in this paper by
providing an empirical method for converting polls into probabilities. We also build on previous studies
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comparing opinion polls and prediction markets by considering a range of prediction markets, rather than
a single one. In Section 2 we introduce our datasets, giving some detail about the nature of each source
of forecasts, and the information we have for each source. In Section 3 we discuss our methodology for
transforming vote-share polls into probabilistic forecasts, and for subsequently appraising each forecast
source based on bias and precision. In Section 4 we provide the results, comparing our prediction
markets to each other and to opinion polls, and in Section 5 we conclude.
2 Data
Data are fundamental to this investigation, and hence we firstly introduce our data and sources before
discussing our methods. As our primary aim is to convert opinion polling data into a form more
readily comparable to prediction markets, we first introduce our opinion polling data in Section 2.1.
We then introduce prediction market data from Betfair (Section 2.2.1), Intrade (Section 2.2.2) and
IEM (Section 2.2.3). It is important at the outset to be clear; our selection of the period 2008–2012
is dictated by data availability; while polling information is available for much longer than the selected
sample period, the particular form of data we have from Betfair and Intrade is not.
2.1 Opinion Polls
We collect all polls reported by Real Clear Politics (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/) for elections
in 2010 and 2012, and augment nationwide presidential election polls with those reported by Pollster
(http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster).1 This yields 271 elections, with the 2012 Presidential
race yielding by some distance the greatest number of polls at 1609, of which 1098 are at the state level.
The data contains the polled vote shares for all candidates in an election, along with the date range the
poll was conducted over, the sample size and the type of sample constructed (almost exclusively one
of: adults, registered voters or likely voters), the pollster (plus an indication of whether that pollster is
known to favour Republicans or Democrats).
In Figure 2 we plot the absolute error for polls by the number of days until the election. For both
types of candidate, 89% of polls are within ten points of the actual outcome, 38% are within three points,
and 12% are within a single point.
The units on the vertical axis of Figure 2 relative to, say, Figure 5, reveals a problem with comparing
prediction markets to opinion polls: Opinion polls in general quote vote shares, whereas prediction
markets in general report probabilistic forecasts of election outcomes. We can, nonetheless, view the
distribution of opinion poll vote shares as a probability distribution for election outcomes, and generate
probabilities of outcomes; in Section 3 we outline our method for converting one to the other.
When considering opinion polls as forecasts, we note that polls only report (imperfectly) intended
voting behaviour at a particular point in time, usually some time before the election actually occurs.2
In the sense that opinion polls provide information, in advance, on a variable to be revealed at a future
point in time (election day), they are nonetheless forecasts, and we treat them this way.
1For simplicity we ignore primary polling as this often relates to multiple-candidate elections which adds complications.
2Graefe (2013) considers an alternative, less commonly publicised type of poll: vote expectation surveys which ask
voters which candidate they believe will win the election, rather than which candidate they will vote for.
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Figure 2: Absolute difference between each polled vote share and each outcome in 2010 and 2012, where
Democrat and Republican errors are distinguished by different points. Source: Pollster and Real Clear
Politics.
2.2 Prediction Markets
2.2.1 Betfair
Betfair is a UK-based betting exchange, or prediction market. It enables willing bettors to both back
events to happen (buy contracts whose payout is contingent on the outcome of events), or lay them (sell
contracts). It specialises in common sporting markets like horse racing and football, but also offers
markets for political events. Betfair claimed to have over 4 million customers and a turnover of £50m a
week.3 Betfair matches those willing to back events with those willing to lay them at particular prices,
and charges a commission of betweeen 2 and 5% on net winnings.4 Bets on Betfair are denominated
in decimal odds, which represent the multiple of the amount bet that must be exchanged if the event
occurs. The reciprocal of decimals odds is commonly interpreted as the implied probability of the event
being bet on occurring.
Our dataset includes every single trade on Betfair in the four-year election cycle between the Presi-
dential elections in 2008 and 2012. It includes a number of markets not just in the US but more widely.
We have information on the precise second at which a bet was placed, the average price at which it was
placed, how much was bet, whether it was to back or lay and which event. In total over the cycle this
3See “Betfair moves operations to Gibraltar”, The Telegraph, 9 March 2011 (goo.gl/JQS0Er).
4Commission is between 2 and 5% for UK-based traders, but higher for traders based in a number of other countries
(see http://www.betangel.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=15&t=8856).
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Figure 3: Size of bets matched on Betfair by type: Backing an event or laying it.
amounts to 249,756 observations, and £40.7m traded (gross) over 80 different contracts. We are not
aware of any previous study of US election prediction markets and polls that includes data from Betfair,
and hence we provide a unique contribution to the literature in this regard.
The largest single transaction is for £93,796.87, placed at 23:45:51 UTC on the election day, 6th
November 2012, laying Obama to win. The second largest transaction came less than an hour earlier
and similarly was to lay Obama for sixteen pounds less than the largest trade.5 Both of these trades
were at an average price of 1.24, which implies a probability of that event occurring of about 80%. The
largest transaction to back a bet came four days previously on 2nd November at 07:04:29, and was for
£88,733.56, backing Obama to win. These transactions are shown in context in Figure 3; the hollow
circles are bets laid and the solid circles are bets backed.
There are often multiple markets for similar outcomes on Betfair; for the election, there is a market
for the next president, and also the winning party, and as such once the nomination is known for each
of the two major parties, these two markets are essentially identical.6 Figure 4 shows that on election
day these two markets are essentially identical.
Of the 249,756 trades we have information on, 51.4% of bets are laying the event to occur, with the
remainder backing the event. Accordingly, the average bet to back an event is slightly larger at £167.87
(median £15) than it is to lay the event (£158.46, median £9.99). Bets laid are marginally less focussed
on the Presidential election, with 53.4% of them focussed on the candidate or party markets compared
to 59.5% of bets backed. The mean odds that events are backed at is 19.87 (implied probability 5%),
although the median is just 1.93 (implied probability 51.8%), and the mean odds that events are laid at
is 28.69 (median 2.4).7
5As UTC is five hours ahead of Eastern Time, these trades do occur while voting was still open.
6Save for the negligible risk that a candidate may be forced to withdraw before election day.
7Betfair lists prices in decimal odds, and caps prices at 1000 (implying a probability of 0.001. The 75th percentile of
the odds distribution is 5.5, suggesting that the distribution is very skewed by bets placed at very high odds, explaining
the large gap between the mean and median decimal odds.
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Figure 4: Different prices for bets matched on election day in two markets on Betfair: the market for
the winning party and the next president.
2.2.2 Intrade
Intrade was a betting exchange, or prediction market. Based in Ireland, its focus was US political events,
and its trading mechanism differed somewhat from Betfair. On Intrade, willing participants agreed to
trade contracts denominated in US dollars, paying out $10 to the buyer if the event in question occurred,
and zero otherwise. These contracts are priced between a cent and $10, with their price commonly
interpreted as the implied probability of the event occurring.
For Intrade we have all contracts bought and sold, with buyer/seller ID (though no further charac-
teristics), price and quantity, specific contract, and timestamp. Rothschild and Sethi (2016) focus on
the Next President market over the final 15 days of the election campaign, but over the entire election
cycle since late 2008, the dataset has 952,387 observations on 1,106 different contracts bought or sold.8
On average, each trade saw 26.5 contracts exchanged (although the median is just 5 contracts sug-
gesting a rather skewed distribution), at an average price of $29.99, implying a 29.99% probability of the
event being traded on occurring (the median price is 23). Of all the 25 million contracts traded in our
dataset, 30.4% of them paid out (i.e. the event occurred), suggesting a reasonably calibrated market.
A controversy in 2012 was the allegation that Intrade prices for Romney and Obama were manipulated
in an attempt to aid the Republican candidate, Romney. The impact of such trading can be observed
in Figure 5, where of our three prediction markets Intrade has the lowest price for Obama consistently
throughout the second half of 2012. It might thus be anticipated that Intrade would perform worse than
other markets and possibly polls also. It might be noted nonetheless that the Obama/Romney market
constituted only around 21% of all trades in our dataset, with the others scattered across various other
elections including primaries. Furthermore considering particularly large trades, of the 35 trades of 9000
8Our first observation is the first contract sold in the 2012 winning party market, which occurs prior even to the 2008
election on 25th September of that year. Note that like Betfair, there often exist multiple markets for the same event on
Intrade; for example, markets for the winning party and winning candidate at the US presidential election.
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or more contracts, only four are for either of Obama (one) or Romney (three) to win the presidential
election. We mention this not to rule out the possibility of politically motivated market manipulation,
instead to point out that our dataset for Intrade is much broader than the Obama/Romney market.
Rothschild (2009) uses Intrade data corrected for favourite-longshot bias in his comparison with bias-
corrected opinion poll data for US elections over a similar time period to our comparison.
2.2.3 Iowa Electronic Markets
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEMs) are one of the earliest electronic prediction markets, predating both
Betfair and Intrade to the late 1980s, but remain somewhat smaller in nature, potentially at least in
part due to the restrictions placed on trading: the maximum initial balance a trader can deposit is $500.
Traders buy or sell contracts worth $1 if the event occurs, zero otherwise, and these contracts trade at
anywhere between a cent and a dollar. Berg et al. (2008) use IEMs for their comparison of prediction
market and opinion poll forecasts. They find that IEMs outperform opinion polls, particularly over
longer forecast horizons.
We have collected all the IEMs between 2008 and 2012 to coincide with our data from Betfair and
Intrade. This yields 19,068 observations and encompasses 12 markets: Congress, House and Senate
for 2010 and 2012, the Republican Convention 2012, the Iowa Caucus of 2012, the 2010 Florida Senate
election, alongside the 2012 Presidential election.9 IEM data is at a daily frequency and in summary
format: high price, low price, average price and last price, along with the number of contracts exchanged
and the dollar volume exchanged. This raises an important methodological point pertaining to ag-
gregation; our IEM data is aggregated to summary daily information whereas our Betfair and Intrade
data remain fully disaggregated. As our intention is to avoid reducing the information content in our
datasets, we do not aggregate our Betfair or Intrade information; we note that the empirical evidence
regarding forecasting using aggregate or disaggregate variables is mixed (Hendry and Hubrich, 2011).
In total, over the electoral cycle, just under two million contracts were traded on IEM, while the total
dollar amount traded is just over half a million dollars, reflecting that the average price of a contract is
29 cents. This tallies up closely with the likelihood of success of a contract, empirically, over the period,
which was 25%.
In Figure 5 the evolution of the market price on IEM is plotted for the Obama to win market during
the second half for 2012; the IEM price fluctuates between the Betfair and Intrade prices throughout
the period. It appears that in upswings in the Obama price, IEM moves with Betfair, but otherwise
IEM is aligned with Intrade, suggesting that in times when information is entering the market that IEM
and Betfair process that information in a similar manner. Rothschild and Pennock (2014) note research
conducted into potential geographic biases in the processing of information that could sustain the kinds
of price differentials they note between the UK-based Betfair and US-focused Intrade, and the IEM
price may lend partial credence to this view as knowledge of IEM is reasonably geographically limited
to North America (see Figure 12 on page 26), and for periods the IEM price tracks the Intrade price.
3 Methodology
In this section we set out our methodological approach to comparing opinion polls and prediction markets.
We consider the bias and precision of both methods, yet we need to convert opinion polls from vote share
9We exclude the vote share markets as they do not yield a probability of election outcome interpretation as the other
markets do. These markets correspond to 2,207 observations.
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Figure 5: All three prediction markets for Obama to win, June–November 2012.
projections into probabilistic forecasts. In the process of doing this, we bias correct opinion polls, and
hence it is appropriate to also bias correct prediction market forecasts in order to facilitate a more
insightful comparison.
Opinion polls, ideally, are random samples of voting intentions; prediction markets are self-selected
samples of agents trading contracts whose payoffs are contingent on voting outcomes. Neither are
forecasts, strictly speaking, although both are commonly used as forecasts. The theory of enlightened
voters (Gelman and King, 1993) might suggest that opinion polls during election campaigns would display
more variance than prediction markets. This is because opinion polls reflect voters who are becoming
enlightened, while prediction markets may be self-selected samples of the already “enlightened” regarding
the likely outcome of the election. Conversely, prediction markets may be influenced by ‘irrational
exuberance’ and other behavioural traits that increase their volatility; we already noted the presence
of market manipulation in the introduction. It seems unlikely, however, that opinion polls do conduct
truly random samples for many reasons; not least because a number of pollsters may have political
leanings and because it seems plausible that herding instincts and other behavioural biases mean that
voting intentions may be influenced by knowledge of the intentions of other voters.
Fundamentally, the model of information transmission for opinion polls is centralised with the polling
company, whereas for prediction markets it is decentralised amongst market participants. We might
thus assert that prediction markets ought to provide better forecasts than opinion polls by appealing
to the so-called Hayek hypothesis (Hayek, 1945; Smith, 1982) which suggests that markets can work
efficiently even when participants have a limited knowledge of the environment or other participants
(see also Hurley and McDonough, 1995). Of the prediction markets in our sample, Intrade and Betfair
do not restrict the financial exposure participants can accumulate, while IEM does; assuming that the
prediction market mechanism allows information to be conveyed in both prices and quantities, it may
thus be that IEM restricts this process.
Erikson and Wlezien (2008) argue against the superiority of prediction markets, suggesting that
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information on election outcomes from opinion polls is much broader than simply the polled vote share
released, not least because of the enlightened voter idea. Erikson and Wlezien (2008) present evidence
that polls, adjusted for such information by a method of bias correction, provide more accurate forecasts
of election outcomes than prediction markets. The findings of Erikson and Wlezien (2008) are in contrast
to Vaughan Williams and Reade (2016) who compare a richer set of prediction markets (the same set
covered in this paper) to opinion polls, finding that prediction markets perform better. Erikson and
Wlezien (2008) do not adjust prediction markets forecasts, however, suggesting that market prices do
not need correction. This constitutes an assumption that prediction markets are efficient, although
this is not formally tested. Rothschild (2009) does bias correct Intrade prediction market data when
comparing with opinion polls, and concludes in favour of Intrade against opinion polls.
3.1 Conversion and Bias Correction
Practically, the distinction between opinion polls and prediction markets is the units that forecasts are
produced in; opinion polls report projected vote shares for candidates, whereas prediction markets report
probabilities of particular outcomes.
The outcome of election i can be described in terms of vote share, Vij for candidate j, where
∑
j Vij =
1, or alternatively as a probability of victory of candidate j, hence Pij = P (maxk (Vik) = Vij). As we
convert poll shares into implied probabilities of election victory, we refer to Pij exclusively. We denote
the forecast probability from forecast source s as Psij ∈ [0, 1], where s is one of the prediction markets
or opinion polls. Our forecast appraisal compares Psij to the observed election outcome, denoted as
Oij :
Oij =
{
1 if maxk (Vik) = Vij ,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Hence Oij is 1 if candidate j wins election i, zero otherwise.
We need to transform opinion poll outcomes, which are in vote shares, into probabilities regarding
the outcome of the election in order to compare them to predicton market outcomes, which are prices
most commonly expressed in terms of probabilities. As we express vote shares for candidate j in election
i as Vij , we can denote the projected vote share for that candidate in an opinion poll conducted at time
h as V̂ij|h . Converting to outcome probabilities involves estimating the probability of election i being
won by candidate j: P (maxk Vik = Vij |Iij ), where Iij is the information available regarding candidate
j in election i contained in a reported opinion poll.
Methods exist to turn opinion poll vote shares into outcome probabilities; Page (2008) develops
a theoretical parametric approach, while alternatives include non-parametric density estimation using
historical poll outcomes. In recent elections, Nate Silver’s 538 website has been converting polling
information into probabilistic forecasts, although as would be expected with a commercial endeavour,
details regarding the methods employed are undisclosed.10 We follow an empirical approach, employing a
regression method to create probabilities; regression methods as simple as ordinary least squares (OLS)
allow the estimation of the probability associated with observing binary outcomes such as election
outcomes (Oij). OLS estimation with a binary dependent variable can produce estimated probabilities
lying outside the unit interval, and hence we employ an alternative model that mitigates this problem,
the probit model.
10See, for example, http://goo.gl/gv7xQ1, last accessed 16 October 2014.
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A probit regression model using Oij as dependent variable estimates, using historical data, the
probability of election victory conditional on a number of explanatory factors, which we denote by the
vector Xij . We write the model as:
P
(
Vij = max
k
Vik
∣∣∣∣Xij) = Φ (βXij) , (2)
where β is a vector of coefficients, and Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution. In Xij we include information from each poll for candidate j in election i. We include
candidate j’s polled vote share in election i, but we also include the opinion poll vote shares of other
candidates in the election, as well as information on whether the organisation conducting the poll is
identified as sympathising with one or another political party, the sample size and nature of sample
(likely voters, registered voters, adults), and also the number of days until an election. It seems
reasonable to assume that such additional aspects of pollsters provides systematic information on the
likelihood of victory of a candidate polled in addition to the polled vote share, and indeed this tallies
with the method proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (2008) of correcting poll outcomes before comparing
with prediction markets. Erikson and Wlezien (2008) do not need to convert to probabilities as they
consider vote-share IEMs (about 10% of all IEMs over our time period; we exclude these markets from
our study).
Using the estimated coefficients from (2) we then construct fitted, or predicted values: We calculate
̂P (Vij = maxk Vik |Xij ), which are the estimated implied probabilities of election outcomes from our
opinion polls. We limit ourselves to only Republican and Democrat candidates, and run regressions
separately for each party. We run separate regressions for Republican and Democrat candidates, which
enables us to easily allow coefficients to vary between the two types of candidate.
In sum, our method replaces in (2) the election outcome as dependent variable in bias correction
linear regression methods with an indicator variable taking the value 1 if that candidate wins, Oij . In
doing so, we can generate an estimate of the probability of a candidate’s victory, which is the form
in which prediction market forecasts are produced, using the vote share predictions that opinion polls
produce.
A linear regression with the outcome poll share as dependent variable, and the opinion poll share as
an explanatory variable is a bias correction method, and could be written as:
Vij = γV̂ij|h + βXij + uij . (3)
This kind of regression, of outcomes on forecasts, is commonly referred to as a Mincer-Zarnowitz re-
gression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969), and is used to evaluate forecasts. In (3), γ would capture the
direct relationship between opinion poll vote shares and actual vote shares, while Xij is a matrix of
other explanatory variables that might capture biases in opinion polls, and β is a parameter that reflects
their potential influence on outcomes not reflected in the opinion poll vote share V̂ij|h . We set out in
Section 4.1 the explanatory variables that make up Xij , which includes things like the poll sample size
and type, length of time before an election, and the potential partisan nature of a pollster.
The conventional statistical measure of bias, for some estimator θ̂ for a parameter θ, is E
(
θ̂
)
− θ; in
expectation, an unbiased estimator is equal to the true value of the parameter, and so E
(
θ̂
)
− θ = 0.
In terms of forecasts, the question is whether a forecast, P̂ij , made for outcome Oij in advance of its
occurring, is equal in expectation to the true value: E
(
P̂ij
)
−Oij .
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If opinion polls are unbiased and reflect all available information at time h, then γ = 1 and β = 0 in
(3), so that E (Vij) = V̂ij|h .
We can then define bias corrected poll vote shares as V˜ij , and they are calculated according to:
V˜ij = γ̂V̂ij|h + β̂Xij , (4)
where γ̂ and β̂ are ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters γ and β. Hence, as such, we can
think about the opinion poll probabilities that we produce using (2) as bias corrected, as well as simply
converted into appropriate units to compare to prediction market probabilistic forecasts.
One problem when evaluating bias is specifying an alternative hypothesis in order to quantify any
bias that may exist. While unbiasedness implies the functional form E
(
P̂sij
)
= Pij , biasedness could
take many forms, and hence formal testing may be affected by the specification of an alternative. We
firstly consider graphical expressions in order to detect any unusual patterns of bias, and then consider
regression methods to quantify any bias.
A common method of determining the existence of bias in academic analysis of the betting industry
is to run a regression of the form:
Oij = α+ βPijt + eijt, (5)
where Pijt refers to a prediction at time t for candidate j in election i. This is another Mincer-Zarnowitz
regression, similar to (3), the difference being that the forecast is a probabilistic forecast here, and the
outcome a binary variable taking the value one if the event in question occurred. Hence estimated using
least squares, (5), is a linear probability model. The null hypothesis is that forecasts are unbiased (and
efficient), hence E (Oij) = E (Psij). In order for that to be the case we need that α = 1 − β = 0. We
can test this hypothesis using an F test having conducted the regression model described in (5).
As with opinion polls, bias correction is thus possible. We can define a bias-corrected probabilistic
forecast to be P˜ijt:
P˜ijt = α̂+ β̂Pijt. (6)
The alternative hypothesis here is that the bias is linear in form, which is clearly restrictive. Nonetheless,
it is likely that if the actual bias is non-linear, the null of unbiasedness will still be rejected, particularly
for large sample sizes like those we have. We will consider the remaining bias in bias-corrected polls
when comparing the corrected prediction market probabilities to the converted (and hence corrected)
opinion poll projections.
When considering forecasts, their bias is conventionally measured using the forecast error, which is
defined in terms of the forecast and the actual, or true, value:
êsij = Oij − P̂sij . (7)
A forecast with a zero error, in expectation, is unbiased.
As we consider a very large number of forecasts, we must consider methods for summarising each
error. At the same time, such a large number of forecasts enables better evaluation of the expected
value of forecasts from particular sources, relative to actual outturns. For prediction source s ∈
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{betfair, intrade, iem, polls}, the mean forecast error is:
ME = êsij = Oij − P̂sij , (8)
The mean of all forecasts made by each source s, the mean error, is thus a measure of bias.
3.2 Precision
Precision refers to the spread of forecasts, independent of the true value or outcome. As such, the
variance of forecasts is a measure. Conventionally, the reciprocal of the variance is used as the precision
of a measure. This has the property that as forecasts become less precise (hence variance increases),
the measure of precision also falls. In the limit, a measure with infinite (undefined) variance has zero
precision, and point forecasts with zero variance have infinite precision, loosely speaking.
For precision we thus calculate the reciprocal of the variance of the forecasts from each forecast source
s, for a given election i and candidate j:
PRs =
1∑
i
∑
j
(
P̂ij − E
(
P̂ij
))2 . (9)
Note that this measure is independent of the true value or outcomes of forecast events. We calculate
sample variances for each contract (candidate and election) for each prediction market and for opinion
polls, and take the average of these (hence the bar notation in (9)).
3.3 Bias and Precision
The bias and precision in a forecast are both conveniently summarised in the mean squared error measure
of forecast errors:
MSEs =
∑
i
∑
j
(
ê2sij
)
, (10)
= ME2s +
∑
i
∑
j
(
P̂ij − E
(
P̂ij
))2
. (11)
The mean squared error is the sum of the squared bias, and the variance of the forecast, which forms
the precision via (9).
The mean square forecast is often referred to, in binary outcome events like elections, as the Brier
score Brier (1950). The Brier score is a probability scoring rule. Conversely to other probability scoring
rules such as the logarithmic scoring rule, the Brier score should be minimised by the best forecast
model.
Hence we consider the mean error, Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions, and graphical methods, to evaluate
the bias of forecasts, and the variance of forecasts to consider the precision. We then consider the mean
squared forecast error as a summary measure of both.
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4 Results
4.1 Converting Polls to Probabilities
In Table 1 the results of the probit regression converting polled vote shared into implied probabilities
of election victory for candidates, equation (2), are reported in the first two columns. Each column
corresponds to a particular candidate, Republican or Democrat, respectively. The first row of the table
is the constant term, and beneath that the subsequent three rows show the impact on the likelihood of
victory of additional percentage points for a Democratic, Republican and Independence candidate in a
released opinion poll. The coefficients show the anticipated signs; an extra point for a Republican (or
Democratic) candidate increases their likelihood of winning, and conversely an extra point for an Demo-
cratic (Republican) candidate reduces the likelihood of a Republican (Democratic) candidate winning.
The effects are similar in magnitude for each candidate. The impact of an independent candidate is not
symmetric across the two types of candidate, however; an increased polling share for an independent can-
didate reduces the likelihood of a Republican candidate winning, but not a Democratic candidate. The
impact of an independent candidate’s vote share is about three fifths of that of a Democratic candidate’s
vote share.
Beneath the impact of candidate votes shares are a number of other explanatory variables which may
capture biases in opinion polls. The coefficients differ for the type of sample, which can be composed of
likely voters, registered voters, or simply adults. Both likely and registered voters increase the likelihood
of a Republican victory relative to polls of adults, whereas the opposite is true for the probability of a
Democratic victory. All four coefficients are borderline significant, but they potentially signify biases
in the construction of opinion polls; by including terms such as these, in the process of turning opinion
polls into probabilities, we bias correct polls. The closer to election day a poll is conducted, the larger
(smaller) is the probability of a Democratic (Republican) victory. Finally the impact of pollsters aligned
to particular parties is shown by the final two coefficients; the likelihood of a Republican victory is greater
given we observe a poll from a partisan pollster, whereas a Democrat victory is less likely. Both effects
are independent of the political leaning of the pollster and suggest that all partisan polls induce biases.
It is difficult to interpret these coefficients due to the dependent variable being likelihood of victory;
in order to get a better sense of the biases that our probit models correct whilst generating probabilities
of victory, we also report in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 a linear regression of the polled
vote shares on all the explanatory variables used to generate probabilities; that is, estimates of (3).
Fewer coefficients are significant in these regressions relative to the probit regressions. The con-
stant term is the average vote share with all other explanatory variables set to zero, and as such is not
particularly informative, although taken in conjunction with the subsequent two rows, the polled vote
shares for the candidates, it becomes a little more meaningful. The Republican coefficient in the Re-
publican (Democrat) regression, at 0.447 (-0.286), is the marginal effect of an extra Republican polling
point, whereas the Democrat coefficient in the Republican (Democrat) regression, 0.443 (0.656), is the
marginal effect of an extra Democrat polling point. Taking the example of a 50/50 poll, this would
suggest, taking the constant term (but setting all other variables to zero), that the corrected polled vote
shares should be 51.1% for the Democrat candidate, and 49.6% for the Republican candidate.
If a poll is constructed of likely (registered) voters this reduces the corrected Republican vote share by
almost two (one) points, suggesting that these two types of polls over-estimate the likely Republican vote,
while there is no impact on the Democrat vote. In identified partisan Democrat pollster underweights
the Republican candidate by 0.7 points, and overweights the Democrat candidate by 1.3 points, while
13
Dependent variable:
Republican win Democrat win Republican Vote Share Democrat Vote Share
probit probit OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 3.550∗∗∗ −4.548∗∗∗ 49.437∗∗∗ 32.582∗∗∗
(0.625) (0.637) (1.063) (1.074)
Republican Opinion Poll Vote Share 0.091∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Democrat Opinion Poll Vote Share −0.196∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Independent Opinion Poll Vote Share −0.082∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.467∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Days until election −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.001∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Sample Size −0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Likely Voters 0.850∗ −0.994∗∗ −1.865∗∗∗ 0.198
(0.473) (0.474) (0.584) (0.590)
Registered Voters 0.965∗∗ −1.088∗∗ −1.235∗∗ 0.526
(0.472) (0.475) (0.577) (0.583)
Identified Democratic Pollster 0.638∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ −1.294∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.074) (0.161) (0.163)
Identified Republican Pollster 0.484∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ 0.073 −0.535
(0.143) (0.147) (0.352) (0.356)
Observations 4,025 4,025 4,025 4,025
R2 0.666 0.781
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.781
Log Likelihood −1,297.573 −1,250.410
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,615.146 2,520.819
Residual Std. Error (df = 4015) 3.773 3.811
F Statistic (df = 9; 4015) 887.808∗∗∗ 1,593.581∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1: Probit regressions to create probabilities for election outcomes.
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there is no significant impact of a Republican pollster (potentially reflecting the lower number of these
pollsters in our dataset).
Figure 6 graphically represents both regression models. The top row shows the conversion of vote
shares into probabilities for Republican (left) and Democratic (right) polls; with Republican polls there is
much greater spread between 30 and 60 spread across the range of probabilities, whereas for Democrats
the spread of poll shares is smaller. The variation around the curve represents the impact of other
explanatory variables. Using these probabilities we can revisit the 2012 presidential campaign; in
Figure 7 we plot the associated probabilities to the polls. The implied probabilities show the importance
of considering polls in context; only a small number of polls imply the race was particularly close, with
most yielding an 80-20 split in terms of probabilities.
The bottom row of plots in Figure 6 shows the correction for various factors that bias polled vote
shares: The horizontal axis is the original polled vote share and the vertical axis is the corrected vote
share. These plots are equivalent to plotting the actual values against the fitted values for our vote
share linear regression model (3) as reported in Table 1. Both plots have a 45-degree line which shows
the extent to which vote shares are impacted by our regression method. Both plots show a similar
impact of the correction of polls, namely a reversion to the centre; polled vote shares above 50% are
pulled back towards 50%, while those below 50% are pushed up towards it. This would appear to
suggest that raw opinion polls are somewhat too extreme in their prediction of likely outcomes. This
conclusion would certainly seem in line with the findings of Erikson and Wlezien (2008) who suggest
that using raw opinion poll numbers is unwise due to such known biases as those our regressions here
have shown. The added value in our method, adding in further explanatory variables, enables further
biases to be corrected, rather than simply remaining in the residuals as would be the case in a more
basic bias correction method.
4.2 Bias
Figures 8–11 give a graphical representation of bias. In all plots, the horizontal axis represents the fore-
cast outcome probability (hence is on the unit interval), while the vertical axis represents the frequency
of outcomes; the proportion of all forecasts of a particular probability that turn out to occur. Unbiased
forecasts would be scattered around the 45 degree line on such a plot, as this would represent proba-
bilistic forecasts occurring as frequently as predicted.11 From each plot, we see that the points plotted
appear visually some distance from the 45 degree line, indicating some degree of bias. In Figures 8
and 9, Betfair and Intrade, the red bars reflect the number of bets agreed at that implied probability
forecast, and the relative frequency can be found on the right-hand scale in both cases. These two plots
also display a distinct pattern for the apparent bias in prediction market forecasts; a flat relationship
below about 40%, and above 60%, and a steep relationship between 40 and 60%. This suggests that any
event that either market identifies to be more than about 60% likely to occur almost always occurs, and
equally any event that either market identifies as being less than about 40% likely to occer very rarely
occurs. This distinct relationship is not visible for either IEM (Figure 10) or opinion polls (Figure 11).
These two plots display a more linear relationship around the 45-degree line, indicative of less bias.
11For example, 50% of forecasts that put the probability of an event occurring at 50% turn out to be correct.
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Figure 6: Plots related to opinion poll data. Top row graphically represents converting Republican (left)
and Democrat (right) polls into probabilities of outcomes. Bottom row plots polled vote shares against
corrected polled vote shares for Republican (left) and Democrat (right) polls. Source: Real Clear Politics
and Pollster.com
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We report the output of Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions to determine forecast bias (see (5)) in Table 3;
each column corresponds to a different regression on a different market. The leftmost columns are
Betfair and Intrade, regressed over every bet matched in those markets, before there are four columns
for the summary daily information reported by IEM, and finally on the right there are Democrat and
Republican polls.
The coefficients of the regression models relate to bias and specifically the favourite-longshot bias:
Forecast outcomes occur too frequently for favourites, and too infrequently for outsiders, relatively.
The favourite-longshot bias manifests itself in a beta coefficient above 1, and thus we can conclude that
there is a strong favourite-longshot bias on both Betfair (β̂ = 1.449) and Intrade (β̂ = 1.24), a strong
reverse favourite-longshot bias with all IEM prices (β̂ coefficients between 0.61 and 0.89), and a small
favourite-longshot bias for polls (β̂ = 1.034, 1.036).
These regression results are consistent with the graphic representations of bias in Figures 8–11, since
Betfair and Intrade have the most pronounced departures from the 45-degree line. This is interesting
in our context as it raises something of a paradox; if forecasts are biased upwards for favourites but
downwards for outsiders, then this could be argued to be a good forecast performance: favourites are
correctly identified and strongly predicted to succeed. In the extreme, we might anticipate seeing
forecasts above 50% occurring 100% of the time, and forecasts below 50% occurring 0% of the time.
This performance would rank poorly in terms of our measures considered here, yet from a practical
purpose would imply that that particular forecast was very effective. Based on Figures 8–11, we might
conclude that Betfair and Intrade perform best in this latter regard, with forecasts either side of 50%
being either around 100% or 0%; both exhibit a strong favourite-longshot bias. Furthermore, we might
argue that Betfair is more decisive in this regard than Intrade, as reflected in the size of the depature
of β coefficients from one. Hence we might conclude that Betfair and Intrade are more likely to yield
correct forecasts even if they exhibit more bias than (corrected) polls, and specifically for favourites we
see that Betfair is very decisive, with identified favourites more likely to win by up to 25 percentage
points.
Considering bias more generally, we report mean errors in Table 2 on the second row. Opinion polls
report the smallest bias, with a tiny 0.1 percentage points either way being the bias for Democratic
(negative) and Republican (positive) polls. It is perhaps to be noted that in the construction of these
probabilities (see Section 4.1) we removed biases induced by known Democratic or Republican leaning
pollsters, and other measurable biases.12 Following polls, Intrade reports the smallest bias at 0.4
(positive) percentage points, IEM report biases between 3 and 7 percentage points, while Betfair’s bias
is 5 percentage points. Thus in terms of bias on individual forecasts relative to the binary outcome of
that election, we can say that corrected polls display the least bias, followed by Intrade, then Betfair
and IEM. We report Betfair and Intrade probabilities corrected using the linear regressions in Table 3,
and naturally we discover that bias corrected forecasts have no bias.
Thus, in terms of bias, opinion polls perform best, although they are bias corrected, and of the
prediction markets although there is no obvious best performer, it does appear that Intrade displays
slightly less bias.
12Note, also, that the (D) and (R) in tables refer to polls for Democrat or Republican candidates, rather than probabilities
from pollsters with known politican leanings.
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4.3 Precision
To measure the precision of forecasts, we consider the variance of forecasts from each source, and its
reciprocal. The variance is listed on the third row of Table 2, and the precision, on the fourth row. A
lower variance is a desirable property, and by construction, a higher value of precision also.
The three prediction markets all have lower variances than opinion polls, and hence higher precision.
IEMs show the lowest variance, which cannot be attributed alone to the daily frequency of the data; if
we aggregate Betfair and Intrade prices to the daily frequency, they still display greater variance than
IEMs.
The bias-corrected Betfair and Intrade probabilities display considerably less precision, and greater
variance, likely reflecting the linear bias-correction for what is a heavily non-linear bias, as revealed in
Figures 8 and 9.
We can consider also the mean squared error, or Brier score, which is provided in the first row
of Table 2, which combines both bias and precision, from (11). We find that Betfair and Intrade
perform slightly better than the bias-corrected polls, and considerably better than the (uncorrected)
IEM polls, and the bias-corrected Betfair and Intrade predictions provide further improvements in terms
of predicting.
Hence the picture appears somewhat mixed. As noted in Section 3, the Hayek hypothesis suggests
that decentralised prediction markets ought to provide better forecasts of outcomes than the more
centralised opinion polls. Nonetheless, Erikson and Wlezien (2008) proposed that corrected polls can
perform comparably well. In line with this, we find that our corrected polls do exhibit less bias, yet they
seem generally less precise. In terms of prediction markets, they appear to show small but correctable
biases, and are relatively precise. There are differences between the prediction markets nonetheless, with
IEM showing greater precision but more bias than the two larger markets, Betfair and Intrade.
5 Conclusions
Election outcomes matter for economic outcomes; as such, determining effective ways to forecast electoral
outcomes is important. In this paper we provide an empirical method to transform opinion poll vote
shares into outcome probabilities in order to allow a comparison between prediction markets and polls
around the 2008–2012 US election cycle. We consider a richer range of prediction markets than most
previous studies, evaluating Intrade, Betfair and Iowa Electronic Markets, as well as all polls available for
elections during this period. We correct the polls for a range of known biases, as well as unknown biases
in the process of converting vote shares to probability forecasts in order to compare directly to prediction
markets, and we find that these corrected forecasts exhibit little bias but unfavourable precision relative
to prediction markets.
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